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1970’s, well interference emerged as a highly volatile
the allocation of groundwater in states bordering the
humid East and the arid West. Well. interference is the lowering of
water levels of wells adjacent to or neighboring a high capacity well
during and shortly after the period in which the high capacity well is
being pumped. It is generally a temporary hydraulic phenomenon, as
distinguished from long term overall lowering of the water level in an
aquifer caused by pumping exceeding recharge.
States such as Iowa, Minnesota, and South Dakota, bordering humid
and arid regions, have experienced dramatically increased groundwater
irrigation in the last decade. Although the actual number of cases of
interference in these states is relatively small, and aggregate economic
damages thus far are slight, the political impact has been significant.
Under these conditions, the problem, whether actual or perceived,
becomes a major factor in shaping the future course of groundwater
policy.
‘Thepolitical impact of the problem resulted largely from widespread
public unease about the adequacy of water supplies during the drought
period of 1974-76. Most of the conflicts arose from new irrigation
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wells interfering with existing domestic wells. The drought, combined
with rapidly increasing use of groundwater for irrigation, causeclall
three states to review, and to some extent, revise their groundwater
allocation policies. Most of the revised rules have emerged since the
easing of the drought, and have not been subject to the degree of:public
scrutiny to which they might have been exposed a few years before.
Nor have they been tested to any great extent in actual practice or
litigation. Thus, it is appropriate to examine these policies in light
of economic effects they are likely to have. Specifically, the purpose
of this paper is to examine efficiency and equity implications of the
well interference policies of South Dakota, Iowa, and Minnesota, and to
draw implications for rational policy to deal with well interference in
semi-arid states.
Effects in Semi-Arid Regions
There are several physical, economic, and social reasons why well
interference is a greater problem in “border” states than in the more
arid West. Natural precipitation is greater in the border states, and
evapotranspiration is generally lower:,making traditional non-irrigated
agriculture a much more viable alternative to irrigation than is usually
the case in the west. Irrigation is of a supplemental nature in the
border states, usual water applications are less than 12 inches per
year. A relatively small percentage of farmers irrigate, and the prac-
tice of irrigation is not regarded with the same degree of legitimacy
as in the West.
There are also hydrologic differences. Western aquifers tend to
be large, thick outwash formations of relatively uniform composition.-3-
Aquifers in the states of Iowa, Minnesota, and South Dakota are often
relatively small aquifers located in a jumble of glacial till material.
They are often severely limited in area and thickness, and may vary
widely in transmissivity and other characteristics within a very short
distance. While many aquifers may produce wells with sufficient yields
for irrigation, and may receive enough recharge to support irrigation,
their physical characteristics are such that severe well interference
or other short term drawdown problems result from such use. Population
density is usually higher in border states than in
distances between irrigation wells and neighboring
shorter.




gation wells. Interfered wells are usually used for domestic supply,
and livestock watering. Serious problems usually occur only when the
interfered well is completely dried out, at least for some period of
time. There may be other cases where well interference results in
higher pumping costs in the interfered well, but total quantities
pumped are usually so low that the costs are negligible. The VT@ of
water produced by the interfered wells is usually high however. More-
over, economic losses from well interference are seldom limited to
foregone production. There may be costs from other damages such as
burned out pump motors and health or production losses to livestock.
For example, dairy cows which are forced to go without water for
relatively short periods early in their lactation may suffer from
decreased production for the rest of the lactation period.-4-
Well Interference as an Externality
Well interference is a classic example of an economic externality
of production, an activity of one economic unit that unintentionally
affects the utility or well-being of another. When the pumping of a high
capacity well, such as an irrigation well, causes interference with
neighboring wells, the owners of existing neighboring wells incur costs
that they would not have incurred if the high capacity well were not
used. These costs may be higher energy costs resulting from pumping
from a greater depth, or in more serious cases, the cost of installing
a new pump, or construction of a new and deeper well.
There are both equity and efficiency effects from this phenomenon.
There is net efficiency gain to society insofar as the value of the
marginal product exceeds the marginal social cost of pumping the water.
However, there is an efficiency loss because the irrigator using the
high capacity well does not bear all the costs to society of pumping.
Hence, he will pump more than is optimal from a resource efficiency
standpoint. There will be a dead weight lost to society from the supra-
optimal use of resources.
The equity effect is that the irrigator gains the value of the
marginal product of the water, a portion of which is at the expense
of the owner of the existing neighboring well who bears higher pumping
costs and perhaps experiences temporary water shortages. This
phenomenon can be illustrated with a simple graphic model.
In this model the producer faces two economic parameters. One is
his marginal cost of pumping water, MCP. This cost is determined by
fuel and variable labor costs, and is nearly horizontal within theFIGURE 1.
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relevant range. The producer also faces a value of marginal product
curve, VMP.L’ This is the potential. value that could be produced, at
each level of water use, by using one more unit of water. For many
water using activities, particularly agricultural irrigation, the value
of marginal product is a decreasing function which may decline to zero
or even become negative.
As a rational profit maximizer, the producer pumps until the value
produced by the last unit of water he uses :isequal to the cost of
pumping it. In our diagram that quantity of water is ql. The producer
realizes a surplus of value produced over costs equal to the triangular
area acd. Unfortunately, the producers pumping costs are not the only
costs to society of this activity. Well interference occurs, and
while nearly costless at low levels of pumping, it becomes rapidly
more costly at higher levels of pumping. These external costs of well
interference, when added to the producers pumping costs, form the total
costs to society as a whole. The marginal costs to society at each
level of water use are represented by the curve MC . The marginal cost s
of well interference at any point is the vertical distance between
MCP and MCs.
We can see that part of the producer’s surplus acd was in fact
transfer from persons affected by well interference. The amount of
transfer is equal to the area of trangle ace. This is made up of




of well interference. The remaining portion of the transfer, bee, has
.!
‘f VI@ =(~~t.l ;;wue, , or Marginal physical product multiplied
by the price of the product.-6-
has both equity and efficiency implications.
From the point of view of society as a whole, the optimum level
of water use does not occur at q~, but rather at q2 where the VMP is
equal to marginal cost to society rather than marginal cost to the
producer, Producing at level ql rather than at q2 has two effects,
a transfer from society, or in this case, neighbors, to the producer
equal to triangle bee, and a dead weight loss equal to triangle cfe.
The triangle bce and cfe represent the efficiency effect of well
interference, bce being a transfer to the irrigator, and cfe being
a dead weight loss to society.
In this model, the difference between the producer’s marginal
cost, MCP and the marginal cost to society MCs consists of the
additional cost of pumping water in affected wells and
caused by temporary water shortages during one pumping




new, deeper domestic wells. This action would shift the seasonal
marginal cost to society to MCs. This would allow the producer to
continue to pump ql units of water without causing appreciable trans-
fers or losses. This solution would be preferable for society if the
cost of the new wells is less than the present value of the external




rules or administrative procedures to q
2“
If pumping were allowed
ql> the new well, allowing costs to shift to MSs would be preferable
the cost of the new well were less than the present value of area acf.
Area ace represents the dead weight loss no longer occuring.
Based on these equity and efficiency characteristics of well
interference, one can derive several criteria by which to evaluate–l-
well interference policies. With respect to efficient resource allocation,
laws and administrative regulations should minimize dead weight losses to
society while enabling real income gains that may result from high capacity
pumping. With respect to equity; laws, rules and regulations should
recognize the transfers which may occur under high capacity pumping, and
depending on the value judgments of society, reduce or compensate for
2/
the transfers that take place.– This has implications for efficiency
since failure to prov%de for compensation may prevent irrigation
benefits from occuring. Finally, policies, and procedures that are
adopted should not be cause equity or efficiency effects that are more
severe than those which are intended to alleviate. For example,
cumbersome administrati.ve procedures and/or lengthy litigation are real
costs to society and may have undesirable equity effects.
With this background, we now turn to an analysis
policies.
Analysis of State Policies
Groundwater use in Minnesota is regulated by its




as an issue is evidenced by the fact that about 20 percent of the
text of the DNR’s agency rules governing water appropriation deal
with procedures to avoid or abate the problem of well interference.
The basic intent of Minnesota’s policy appears to be to force
large users to provide compensation for any damages caused by their
~’Most observers would agree that the party who irrigates should
compensate the party who is injured. However, some writers argue
that there is no a priori reason why the party that stands to lose
by an action should have a favored position over the party who
loses by not being allowed to undertake any action.-8-
pumping. The pumper “shall be responsible for all costs necessary
to provide an adequate supply with the quality and quantity as prior
,,3/
to the applicants or permittee’s interference. –
Applicants for a permit to pump groundwater for irrigation are
required to submit detailed information about the location of their
well. If the aquifer is not one for which the DNR has “adequate”
information from which to estimate drawdown and effect on existing
wells, the applicant is required to conduct a test. This test
consists of pumping the well for at least 24 hours while observing
drawdown and subsequent recovery in one or more observation wells.
The information produced from the test is used in a computer
analysis to predict interference effects in nearby wells. If it
appears likely that one or more neighbor will be deprived of water
at any period of time, the DNR may not issue the permit until the
applicant reaches an agreement with all affected parties detailing
the abatement or compensation the application will offer to the
party potentially damaged.
After the permit to pump is issued, any party who realizes
changes presumably caused by the new irrigator can register a
complaint to the DNR. The DNR is required to investigate all
complaints. If a complaint to substantiated, the DNR is required
to restrict or suspend the permit until the permittee reaches an
agreement with the affected parties.
—
2’MCAR 1. 5053A. 3C (l.)(a)--9-
How does Minnesota’s policy rate with respect to the criteria for
efficiency and equity described above? Regarding efficiency, because
the irrigator is forced to compensate neighbors for damages to their
wells, the irrigator effectively faces the maximum cost to society,
the MCs curve illustrated in Figure 1. Thus, the irrigator has the
incentive to operate at q2 and the deadweight loss to society is likely
to be minimal. Further, the gains to society resulting from increased
real product from irrigation are allowed to accrue insofar as provision
is made for the irrigator to negotiate with owners of neighboring wells
regarding compensation.
With respect to equity, the irrigator is forced to absorb the cost
represented by the area a b e in Figure 1, and no transfers will occur.
Another advantage of the policy regarding both efficiency and
equity is that the usually difficult task of estimating marginal costs
is left to be resolved by tiheaffected parties on the basis
of approximately equal bargaining power. Parties in the bargaining
process are prevented from exhibiting a monopoly or veto power by a
provision which allows appeal to impartial arbitration by any party who
feels his/her opponents are unreasonable.
The policy can be criticized on the basis of administrative and
transaction costs. If the ultimate result; liability on the part of
the water user, with negotiated compensation, remains the same, we
can question the justification of the time consuming and expensive
permit application and evaluation process. The current practice does
little to reduce any uncertainty on the part of the producer. He
must incur most of his ultimate investment costs as part of the
application process, and issuance, of a permit is no guarantee that-1o-
subsequent problems will not result in its being suspended. However,
one can argue that the pumping test may permit the affected parties
and the DNR to anticipate problems which may later arise. Furthermore,
the transaction costs are much cheaper than those which would result
from litigation in the courts at a later time.
It might be argued that the aquifer test requirement has some
external benefit to society in that i.nformati.on is generated which
will reduce uncertainty for future potential water users. This
argument can be countered on two points, The same information could
be generated over time by systematic lower-cost data collection during
normal use of the well.. Secondly, requiring initial developers to
bear all the costs of generating information that later developers
will benefit from, tends to discourage such development. This is a
variant of the classic questions of copyrights and patents. The
resulting disincentive to development could result in efficiency
losses equal to the value of foregone production.
South Dakota’s procedures are in some respects similar to those
of Minnesota. Applicants for high capacity well permits are required
to submit information about the location and the geologic characteristics
of their proposal wells to the Department of Natural Resources
Development (DNRD), DNRD staff members evaluate the application on
several grounds, including the like].ihood of well interference. The
information required and analysis made are not as detailed as in
Minnesota. However, the body of collected hydrologic information is
greater in South Dakota than in Minnesota, thereby providing a
rationale for not requiring many of the hydrologic details required in
Minnesota. The DNRD staff recommends to the state Water Right Commission-11-
whether to approve or disapprove the application.
If it appears that a domestic well will be interfered with, and
that well is an “adequate” well, the Commission will not approve the
application. The key question here is what constitutes an adequate
well. While Minnesota protects all existing wells, South Dakota
protects only those wells that meet standards of adequacy. Generally,
an adequate well must fully penetrate the aquifer and have its pump
set just above the screen. Many existing wells do not meet these
standards since the statutory requirements are in excess of what
would be needed to construct an aequate well. in the absence of
irrigation. Water wells typically have long lives, and most existing
domestic wells were constructed before the development of large scale
groundwater irrigation.
If the interfered well does not meet the adequacy standards, there
is no protection to the owner, and the owner of the interfered well
must bear all the costs of the interference. If the well is adequate,
the permit is not issued, and the high capacity well owner has no
recourse. If he is able to reach an agreement with the interfered
party, the WRC may issue the permit. However, no state agency is
authorized to encourage or require such a bargaining process. The
domestic well owner holds a near absolute veto power. If he is not
satisfied with any offer of compensation, the high capacity well
remains shut down. Similar procedures are followed in cases of
interference that are not predicted during the permit application
process, but which do materialize later.
How does this policy rate with respect to efficiency and equity
criteria? This policy results in an all or nothing situation. If the-12-
affected well is “adequate”, and interference there may be no use of
water at all, resulting in an efficiency loss through the loss of real
product that could have been produced with irrigation. If the well is
not adequate, and interference occurs, the results are the same as in
Figure 1, where production occurs to point q], and both efficiency and
equity effects occur. There is a supra-optimal use of resources, a
resulting dead weight loss, and a transfer of income from the owner of
the interference well to the irrigation.
South Dakota has at least one other policy designed to reduce
interference problems. This is a well spacing requirement. All high
capacity wells must be located at least 660 feet from any domestic
wells. This provision may have some justification in that it precludes
the worst possible cases of well interference.
This rule, being rather “cut and dried”, has relatively low
administrative costs. Other than this, it has few effects. It has no
effects on any interference of wells located more than 660 feet apart
which is still a highly possible occurrence. While it precludes the
transfers and efficiency losses that would occur a distance less than
660 feet, it also precludes any production from cases where interference
would not occur even at short distances. There appears to be little
or no economic justification for such a policy since it precludes the
possibility of society benefiting from the economic product which
would be realized from irrigation. To the extent that well interference
can cause undesirable efficiency and equity effects, an attempt to
reconcile these with the efficiency gains from irrigation is certainly
worthy of efforts by policy makers.
The impact of well interference as a political issue in the mid
1970’s was perhaps greater in Iowa than in any neighboring states._13-
Public concern about groundwater development led to a three year near-
moratorium on the issuance of new permits. Permits issued during this
period were limited to a term of one year.
At present, Iowa has no formal policy for dealing with well
interference. Surprisingly, in spite of the “near moratorium on
irrigation permits”, the problem is not specifically mentioned in any
Iowa statute or agency rules. The Iowa Natural Resource Council deals
with approximately ten cases that occur each year on an ad hoc
basis ~1
. If there are indications that well interference may occur,
permit applications may be denied on the grounds of inadequacy of water
supply . No formal investigation of the probability of occurrence is
made, however. If interference actually occurs, the parties involved
are informally urged to reach a private agreement. If this effort is
not successful, the INRC may investigate the complaint. If it is
substantiated, the Council may terminate the permit. There is no formal
mechanism for arbitration or determination of compensation. The INRC
can either terminate or not terminate the permit, but it cannot
order abatement procedures or compensation. If either party to the
dispute is dissatisfied with INRC actions, their recourse is to proceed
with litigation under common law in the state courts. This generally
is a viable although costly, alternative for the party damaged by
interference. The high capacity groundwater user may be denied access
to the resource on grounds that he feels are unreasonable.
Another component of the state policy is the groundwater irrigation
development has been effectively banned in many areas by moratoria on
the issuance of new permits for a number of aquifers. Justification
4/ — Interview with Louis Gieseke, Water Commissioner. Iowa Natural
Resource Council, March 5, 1980.-14-
given is the prevention of groundwater mining, but avoiding well
5/
interference disputes was also a factor in the policy decision.—
There appears to be a number of efficiency effects of Iowa’s
policy. The lack
as a disincentive
of a defined policy increases uncertainty and acts
to irrigation development. Liti~ation itself is
costly. The amount by which the costs of litigation exceed the costs
of alternative methods of resolving disputes can be viewed as a
deadweight loss to society. The policy of limiting the INRC to the
“either-or” options of no action or total shutoff encourages the INRC
6/
to condone small transfers from the owners of domestic to irrigators.—
The high minimum cost associated with litigation also forces damaged
parties to absorb substantial costs, as long as these costs are below
the threshold of litigation costs.
On the other hand, when interference is substantiated by the INRC,






and is able to extract a form of “monopoly rent”
He still may force the irrigator to pay more than
incurred to in order to obtain his consent for the
can be summarized as undefined and ad hoc with
heavy reliance on traditional legal remedies through litigation. The
policy is a low cost one for the regulatory agency, but it involves
high
have
transaction costs for the parties involved.
In conclusion, the Iowa policies produce indeterminate results,
high transaction costs, and produce considerable uncertainty which-15-
is a formidable barrier to groundwater development and use. The
results appear to be potentially large losses in efficiency.
Summary and Conclusions
The states of Minnesota, South Dakota, and Iowa have distinct
differences in their procedures for dealing with the volatile
problem of well interference. It is economically desirable to
obtain the real gains resulting from irrigation, and to prevent the
deadweight loss to society from a supra–optimal use of resources,
consistent with reasonable transaction costs. The authors assert
that administrative regulations are preferable to litigation in terms
of transactions costs. With respect to equity, the authors place a
value judgment leaning toward minimizing transfers from one party to
another.
It appears from the analysis that Minnesota law is efficient in
permitting irrigation to take place. Deadweight losses from supra-
optimal resource use and transfers do not occur because of the
approximately equal bargaining power of affected parties. The
relatively explicit administrative procedures minimize the chances of
costly and wasteful litigation.
South Dakota policies leave open the possibility of efficiency
loss through the 660 foot spacing law, and possible impediment to
irrigation development if well interference is likely. Provisions for
negotiation are not apparent. Deadweight losses may occur if an
“adequate” well is interfered with. This possibility is likely to open
the door to wasteful litigation.-16-
Iowa’s policies also have aspects contributing to inefficiency.
This stems largely from lack of formal mechanisms to negotiate prior
to commencement of irrigation. There tends to be a lack of certainty
of continuation of a permit, once issued. This serves to impede
development, and the lack of prior procedures is more likely to result
in litigation of differences,
As states in semi-arid regions develop well interference policies,
greater attention needs to be given to efficiency and equity aspects
discussed in this paper. Examination of the experience of states
with diverse procedures, and comparison with the tenets of economic
theory, can lead to efficiency gains and to equitable solutions which
conform to the values of society.